Pass Juniper JN0-364 Exam in First Attempt Guaranteed!
Get 100% Latest Exam Questions, Accurate & Verified Answers!
30 Days Free Updates, Instant Download!
Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 22
Question 210
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. Which bounded approval scope avoids unintended changes to other provider or customer services?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
The approval decision should consider Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The specific proposal is: Approve only the bounded change (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.) after independently checking (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. Its measurable outcome is: The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.
An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.) after independently checking (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event and the session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior, respectively.
Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.) after independently checking (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.
A separate release decision would approve only the bounded change (Confirm the authorized MSTP region, instance mappings and topology design, then align the relevant VLAN-to-instance definitions across participants.) after independently checking (Per-instance operational port states match approved paths and both service VLAN groups retain loop-free reachability during a controlled link failure.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. It does not match the current change: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.
Question 211
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. Which specific bounded Junos routing or switching correction best addresses this service-provider issue?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries. The appropriate response is: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal. Confirm it with: Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.
Another proposed action is: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time. It targets a different dependency; the evidence here is Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Another option proposes: Validate whether the port must be a genuine edge-facing endpoint and preserve or redesign BPDU protection under approved topology changes. The specific correction is: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal. The deciding evidence is: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
That alternative concerns: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint. The relevant evidence is Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The corresponding fix is: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.
Question 212
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Which observed operational evidence most strongly isolates the actual protocol or forwarding condition?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
Another piece of evidence concerns RSTP operational detail shows the new attachment advertising superior BPDUs and becoming root instead of the designated provider bridge. The current incident instead shows: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. This distinction supports the action: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.
The deciding evidence is: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. This distinguishes the problem because BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries. The response it supports is: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.
This other option describes: Routing table attributes show unequal local preference or other policy-driven BGP path attributes, while transport paths remain healthy. The problem to explain is different: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Another proposed finding is: Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior. It is not the recorded discriminator, which is Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Question 213
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. Which Junos networking principle best explains the relevant engineering decision?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries. The recorded evidence is: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The corresponding action is: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.
This alternative invokes: IS-IS uses TLVs to encode protocol information, and route-family visibility must be checked in the correct RIB. Evidence for this case: The IS-IS database contains distinct reachability TLV content while the operational command targets only the inet address family rather than inet6. The governing distinction for the recorded case is BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries.
The competing option invokes: BGP hold timers and KEEPALIVE messages provide session liveness independent of accepted route policies. Evidence for this case: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The present evidence is: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The case-relevant principle is: BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries.
That principle concerns another fact pattern: IBGP route reflection relies on explicit client relationships and correct propagation semantics. Evidence for this case: Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior. Here the key fact is: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Question 214
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Intended bounded correction: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal. Which independently verifiable test best demonstrates the intended correction worked?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: D
That result would assess another condition: The chosen path matches the documented policy intent and forwarding probes follow the selected healthy upstream. The correct criterion is directly linked to the finding: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Another proposed result is: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime. It would not independently establish the required outcome: Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.
A different option checks: Per-instance operational port states match approved paths and both service VLAN groups retain loop-free reachability during a controlled link failure. The case-specific acceptance condition is instead Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.
The independent verification condition is: Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance. That result checks whether the original evidence—Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory—has been addressed.
Question 215
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. Which material service-availability, routing, switching or security risk most directly needs control?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
This limitation concerns another setting: Changing OSPF cost to fix a policy-driven BGP preference can disrupt other routes without changing the actual decision factor. The observed facts here make a different caution decisive: A permissive EBGP export term can leak sensitive or invalid routes and trigger upstream policy enforcement.
A necessary safeguard is: A permissive EBGP export term can leak sensitive or invalid routes and trigger upstream policy enforcement. The proposed correction remains: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.
Another emphasis concerns: Attaching one IRB to multiple unrelated tenant segments can merge routed access and violate boundaries. The current change is Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal; the material limitation is a permissive EBGP export term can leak sensitive or invalid routes and trigger upstream policy enforcement.
This limitation concerns another setting: Changing ASN or routing policy without verifying the transport endpoint can create a separate outage or route leak. The observed facts here make a different caution decisive: A permissive EBGP export term can leak sensitive or invalid routes and trigger upstream policy enforcement.
Question 216
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. Which focused investigation is the most useful before modifying the network configuration?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: C
Another investigation would compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Ethernet frame captures show customer untagged traffic while the bridge interface membership expects an 802.1Q VLAN tag for forwarding. It does not directly establish the reported condition: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
That check concerns a different signal: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. The case-relevant check is: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
The pre-change check should compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. That check directly concerns Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Another investigation would compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Routing table attributes show unequal local preference or other policy-driven BGP path attributes, while transport paths remain healthy. It does not directly establish the reported condition: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Question 217
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. Which controlled operational implementation sequence best protects the related provider service?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: C
Another action-and-check pairing is: First verify the observed failure (Routing table attributes show unequal local preference or other policy-driven BGP path attributes, while transport paths remain healthy.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Inspect applicable BGP best-path attributes and local routing policy before modifying any IGP metric or neighboring AS path.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The chosen path matches the documented policy intent and forwarding probes follow the selected healthy upstream.) before production rollout. The evidence here is Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The required action and proof are Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal and Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.
An alternative plan is: First verify the observed failure (Ethernet frame captures show customer untagged traffic while the bridge interface membership expects an 802.1Q VLAN tag for forwarding.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Verify the handoff contract and bridge interface port mode, then restore only the intended tag treatment and VLAN membership.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The customer CE exchanges untagged frames successfully without gaining access to other wholesale service VLANs.) before production rollout. It does not test the case-specific condition: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries. For this issue, the appropriate bounded intervention is: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal. The acceptance test is: Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.
Another potential sequence is: First verify the observed failure (Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.) before production rollout. It has no direct link to the distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Question 218
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. Which set of evidence, limited change and independent validation best justifies authorization?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
The bounded proposal is: Observed evidence (Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.), limited correction (Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.), independently measurable result (Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.). The separate acceptance measure remains: Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.
Another approval package concerns: Observed evidence (Port diagnostics show a BPDU-protection event as the cause of the interface state transition rather than an optical error.), limited correction (Validate whether the port must be a genuine edge-facing endpoint and preserve or redesign BPDU protection under approved topology changes.), independently measurable result (The approved access segment forwards safely while a repeat unauthorized BPDU test triggers the intended control with an audit trail.). The present scope must instead be justified by Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
An alternative release decision is: Observed evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), limited correction (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.), independently measurable result (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.). It does not match the current change: Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.
Another approval action is: Observed evidence (Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior.), limited correction (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.), independently measurable result (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.). The relevant evidence and acceptance are Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory and Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance, respectively.
Question 219
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. If the change fails its expected acceptance test, which controlled recovery approach is most appropriate?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: C
Another option proposes: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (MAC forwarding tables on the access switch show the customer source learned on an unexpected access port and no destination learning for the intended bridge domain.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess mac-learning issue is confused with upstream bgp routing. Its assumptions differ from the observed failure; the appropriate recovery is: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp export policy reveals a customer-only route to transit.
Another fallback concerns pausing changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Routing table attributes show unequal local preference or other policy-driven BGP path attributes, while transport paths remain healthy.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp best path differs from an operator's simple metric assumption. The current change concerns Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
A contingency plan would pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp export policy reveals a customer-only route to transit. This preserves control of the change linked to Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Another option proposes: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp keepalive hold-time expectations do not match session state. Its assumptions differ from the observed failure; the appropriate recovery is: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp export policy reveals a customer-only route to transit.
Question 220
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A managed service provider detects a customer RFC1918 reachability prefix advertised toward a public upstream during an emergency peer change. Distinguishing evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. Which bounded approval scope avoids unintended changes to other provider or customer services?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Inspect the advertised address-family-specific TLVs and corresponding IPv6 routing table and interface support before changing IS-IS policy.) after independently checking (Both route-family displays match their advertised TLV data and IPv6 next-hop reachability is verified separately.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
The bounded proposal is: Approve only the bounded change (Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.) after independently checking (Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The separate acceptance measure remains: Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.
An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Inspect applicable BGP best-path attributes and local routing policy before modifying any IGP metric or neighboring AS path.) after independently checking (The chosen path matches the documented policy intent and forwarding probes follow the selected healthy upstream.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory and Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance, respectively.
Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.) after independently checking (The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
Service Provider Routing and Switching, Specialist (JNCIS-SP) (JN0-364) Practice Tests
- Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 20 - 10 Questions (Last Reviewed 30-Oct-2026)
- Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 21 - 10 Questions (Last Reviewed 29-Oct-2026)
- Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 22 - 10 Questions (Last Reviewed 28-Oct-2026)
- Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 23 - 10 Questions (Last Reviewed 27-Oct-2026)
- Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 24 - 10 Questions (Last Reviewed 26-Oct-2026)