Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 21 - Prepaway
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Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 21

Question 200

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A regional provider migrates to route-reflector topology but some clients fail to receive routes from other clients despite established sessions. Distinguishing evidence: Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior. Which bounded approval scope avoids unintended changes to other provider or customer services?

  1. Approve only the bounded change (Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.) after independently checking (The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope.
  2. Approve only the bounded change (Validate LAN circuit priority and DIS role independently from route metrics; change only the control-plane election setting if the design requires it.) after independently checking (The designated intermediate system role matches documented circuit priority policy and shortest-path computations remain consistent.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope.
  3. Approve only the bounded change (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.) after independently checking (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope.
  4. Approve only the bounded change (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.) after independently checking (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: C

A.

An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.) after independently checking (The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior and the relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes, respectively.

B.

Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Validate LAN circuit priority and DIS role independently from route metrics; change only the control-plane election setting if the design requires it.) after independently checking (The designated intermediate system role matches documented circuit priority policy and shortest-path computations remain consistent.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior.

C.

The change-control boundary is: Approve only the bounded change (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.) after independently checking (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The evidence for this scope is Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior.

D.

An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.) after independently checking (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior and the relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes, respectively.

Question 201

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. Which specific bounded Junos routing or switching correction best addresses this service-provider issue?

  1. Bounded remedy: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.
  2. Bounded remedy: Validate VLAN and virtual-switch boundaries, physical member state and MAC learning before changing upstream BGP sessions.
  3. Bounded remedy: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
  4. Bounded remedy: Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: A

A.

The issue turns on Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The relevant rule is that BGP hold timers and KEEPALIVE messages provide session liveness independent of accepted route policies. The targeted correction is: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.

B.

Another proposed action is: Validate VLAN and virtual-switch boundaries, physical member state and MAC learning before changing upstream BGP sessions. It targets a different dependency; the evidence here is Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

C.

Another option proposes: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint. The specific correction is: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time. The deciding evidence is: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

D.

That alternative concerns: Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only. The relevant evidence is Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The corresponding fix is: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.

Question 202

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Which observed operational evidence most strongly isolates the actual protocol or forwarding condition?

  1. Differentiating observation: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
  2. Differentiating observation: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.
  3. Differentiating observation: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
  4. Differentiating observation: Port diagnostics show a BPDU-protection event as the cause of the interface state transition rather than an optical error.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: B

A.

This other option describes: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The problem to explain is different: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

B.

The record points to Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. After confirming the clue, the appropriate response is: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.

C.

Another piece of evidence concerns the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The current incident instead shows: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. This distinction supports the action: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.

D.

Another alternative would address Port diagnostics show a BPDU-protection event as the cause of the interface state transition rather than an optical error as decisive. The actual evidence in this case is Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

Question 203

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. Which Junos networking principle best explains the relevant engineering decision?

  1. Applicable protocol principle: BGP hold timers and KEEPALIVE messages provide session liveness independent of accepted route policies. Evidence for this case: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.
  2. Applicable protocol principle: Integrated routing and bridging requires correct VLAN membership and a corresponding L3 IRB interface. Evidence for this case: MAC learning within the broadcast domain is healthy while the IRB logical interface or VLAN-to-IRB binding is missing or mapped to another tenant VLAN.
  3. Applicable protocol principle: BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries. Evidence for this case: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
  4. Applicable protocol principle: IBGP route reflection relies on explicit client relationships and correct propagation semantics. Evidence for this case: Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: A

A.

The observed evidence is: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The governing principle is: BGP hold timers and KEEPALIVE messages provide session liveness independent of accepted route policies. Consequently, the targeted action is: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.

B.

That principle concerns another fact pattern: Integrated routing and bridging requires correct VLAN membership and a corresponding L3 IRB interface. Evidence for this case: MAC learning within the broadcast domain is healthy while the IRB logical interface or VLAN-to-IRB binding is missing or mapped to another tenant VLAN. Here the key fact is: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

C.

A different principle is: BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries. Evidence for this case: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The present evidence, however, is Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The relevant rule is: BGP hold timers and KEEPALIVE messages provide session liveness independent of accepted route policies.

D.

This alternative invokes: IBGP route reflection relies on explicit client relationships and correct propagation semantics. Evidence for this case: Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior. The governing distinction for the recorded case is BGP hold timers and KEEPALIVE messages provide session liveness independent of accepted route policies.

Question 204

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Intended bounded correction: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time. Which independently verifiable test best demonstrates the intended correction worked?

  1. Independent verification: The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.
  2. Independent verification: The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.
  3. Independent verification: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
  4. Independent verification: The provider bridge remains legitimate root and a controlled superior-BPDU test is contained without permanent loop formation.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: B

A.

A different option checks: The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes. The case-specific acceptance condition is instead the session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.

B.

The independent verification condition is: The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior. That result checks whether the original evidence—Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event—has been addressed.

C.

That result would assess another condition: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime. The correct criterion is directly linked to the finding: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

D.

Another proposed result is: The provider bridge remains legitimate root and a controlled superior-BPDU test is contained without permanent loop formation. It would not independently establish the required outcome: The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.

Question 205

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. Which material service-availability, routing, switching or security risk most directly needs control?

  1. Meaningful operational caution: Altering link metrics to force a DIS outcome can reroute unrelated customer traffic without changing election priority.
  2. Meaningful operational caution: A permissive EBGP export term can leak sensitive or invalid routes and trigger upstream policy enforcement.
  3. Meaningful operational caution: Changing OSPF cost to fix a policy-driven BGP preference can disrupt other routes without changing the actual decision factor.
  4. Meaningful operational caution: Excessively lengthening timers to mask dropped keepalives can delay detection of real peer failure.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: D

A.

Another caution is: Altering link metrics to force a DIS outcome can reroute unrelated customer traffic without changing election priority. The key risk in this case is: Excessively lengthening timers to mask dropped keepalives can delay detection of real peer failure.

B.

Another emphasis concerns: A permissive EBGP export term can leak sensitive or invalid routes and trigger upstream policy enforcement. The current change is Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time; the material limitation is Excessively lengthening timers to mask dropped keepalives can delay detection of real peer failure.

C.

This limitation concerns another setting: Changing OSPF cost to fix a policy-driven BGP preference can disrupt other routes without changing the actual decision factor. The observed facts here make a different caution decisive: Excessively lengthening timers to mask dropped keepalives can delay detection of real peer failure.

D.

A necessary safeguard is: Excessively lengthening timers to mask dropped keepalives can delay detection of real peer failure. The proposed correction remains: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.

Question 206

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. Which focused investigation is the most useful before modifying the network configuration?

  1. Focused Junos investigation: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.
  2. Focused Junos investigation: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.
  3. Focused Junos investigation: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
  4. Focused Junos investigation: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: The IS-IS database contains distinct reachability TLV content while the operational command targets only the inet address family rather than inet6.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: A

A.

The pre-change check should compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. That check directly concerns Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

B.

Another check would compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The case observation to isolate is Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The focused check here is: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

C.

Another investigation would compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. It does not directly establish the reported condition: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

D.

That check concerns a different signal: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: The IS-IS database contains distinct reachability TLV content while the operational command targets only the inet address family rather than inet6. The case-relevant check is: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

Question 207

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. Which controlled operational implementation sequence best protects the related provider service?

  1. Controlled engineering sequence: First verify the observed failure (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.) before production rollout.
  2. Controlled engineering sequence: First verify the observed failure (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.) before production rollout.
  3. Controlled engineering sequence: First verify the observed failure (MAC forwarding tables on the access switch show the customer source learned on an unexpected access port and no destination learning for the intended bridge domain.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Validate VLAN and virtual-switch boundaries, physical member state and MAC learning before changing upstream BGP sessions.); then independently verify the intended outcome (Bidirectional test frames learn on the expected ports and remain within the authorized bridge domain without affecting route peers.) before production rollout.
  4. Controlled engineering sequence: First verify the observed failure (Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.); then independently verify the intended outcome (Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.) before production rollout.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: B

A.

Another possible combination is: First verify the observed failure (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.) before production rollout. The current record instead supports Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time, verified by the session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.

B.

The starting point is Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The proposed action and its separate check are Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time and the session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior, respectively.

C.

Another action-and-check pairing is: First verify the observed failure (MAC forwarding tables on the access switch show the customer source learned on an unexpected access port and no destination learning for the intended bridge domain.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Validate VLAN and virtual-switch boundaries, physical member state and MAC learning before changing upstream BGP sessions.); then independently verify the intended outcome (Bidirectional test frames learn on the expected ports and remain within the authorized bridge domain without affecting route peers.) before production rollout. The evidence here is Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The required action and proof are Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time and the session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.

D.

An alternative plan is: First verify the observed failure (Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.); then independently verify the intended outcome (Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.) before production rollout. It does not test the case-specific condition: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

Question 208

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. Which set of evidence, limited change and independent validation best justifies authorization?

  1. Approval package: observed evidence (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.), limited correction (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.), independently measurable result (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.).
  2. Approval package: observed evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), limited correction (Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.), independently measurable result (The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.).
  3. Approval package: observed evidence (Bridge-domain membership reveals two customer-facing interfaces accidentally attached to one virtual switch despite separate service contracts.), limited correction (Separate the tenant virtual switches and bridge-domain scopes while preserving the contracted tag translation on each handoff.), independently measurable result (Broadcast and unknown-unicast tests remain isolated to each customer and independent service port traffic follows expected boundaries.).
  4. Approval package: observed evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), limited correction (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.), independently measurable result (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.).

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: D

A.

Another approval package concerns: Observed evidence (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.), limited correction (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.), independently measurable result (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.). The present scope must instead be justified by Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

B.

An alternative release decision is: Observed evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), limited correction (Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.), independently measurable result (The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.). It does not match the current change: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.

C.

Another approval action is: Observed evidence (Bridge-domain membership reveals two customer-facing interfaces accidentally attached to one virtual switch despite separate service contracts.), limited correction (Separate the tenant virtual switches and bridge-domain scopes while preserving the contracted tag translation on each handoff.), independently measurable result (Broadcast and unknown-unicast tests remain isolated to each customer and independent service port traffic follows expected boundaries.). The relevant evidence and acceptance are Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event and the session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior, respectively.

D.

The change-control boundary is: Observed evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), limited correction (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.), independently measurable result (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.). The evidence for this scope is Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

Question 209

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. If the change fails its expected acceptance test, which controlled recovery approach is most appropriate?

  1. If testing fails: pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp keepalive hold-time expectations do not match session state.
  2. If testing fails: pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp route is received but not imported by policy.
  3. If testing fails: pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (MSTP instance membership and region parameters show the second VLAN mapped into the first spanning-tree instance and mismatched neighboring regional configuration.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess mstp instance mapping creates an unexpected blocked path.
  4. If testing fails: pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Routing table attributes show unequal local preference or other policy-driven BGP path attributes, while transport paths remain healthy.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp best path differs from an operator's simple metric assumption.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: A

A.

A contingency plan would pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp keepalive hold-time expectations do not match session state. This preserves control of the change linked to Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

B.

Another recovery route would pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp route is received but not imported by policy. It does not preserve the condition of this case: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The bounded fallback is: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp keepalive hold-time expectations do not match session state.

C.

Another option proposes: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (MSTP instance membership and region parameters show the second VLAN mapped into the first spanning-tree instance and mismatched neighboring regional configuration.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess mstp instance mapping creates an unexpected blocked path. Its assumptions differ from the observed failure; the appropriate recovery is: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp keepalive hold-time expectations do not match session state.

D.

Another fallback concerns pausing changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Routing table attributes show unequal local preference or other policy-driven BGP path attributes, while transport paths remain healthy.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp best path differs from an operator's simple metric assumption. The current change concerns Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

Question 210

A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider technician interprets a frequently reset BGP neighbor as simply a malformed prefix filter, while the session log shows repeated hold-time expiration. Distinguishing evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. Which bounded approval scope avoids unintended changes to other provider or customer services?

  1. Approve only the bounded change (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.) after independently checking (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope.
  2. Approve only the bounded change (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.) after independently checking (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope.
  3. Approve only the bounded change (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.) after independently checking (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope.
  4. Approve only the bounded change (Confirm the authorized MSTP region, instance mappings and topology design, then align the relevant VLAN-to-instance definitions across participants.) after independently checking (Per-instance operational port states match approved paths and both service VLAN groups retain loop-free reachability during a controlled link failure.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope.

Answer and Explanation

Correct Answer: A

A.

The approval decision should consider Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The specific proposal is: Approve only the bounded change (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.) after independently checking (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. Its measurable outcome is: The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.

B.

An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.) after independently checking (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event and the session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior, respectively.

C.

Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.) after independently checking (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.

D.

A separate release decision would approve only the bounded change (Confirm the authorized MSTP region, instance mappings and topology design, then align the relevant VLAN-to-instance definitions across participants.) after independently checking (Per-instance operational port states match approved paths and both service VLAN groups retain loop-free reachability during a controlled link failure.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. It does not match the current change: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.

Service Provider Routing and Switching, Specialist (JNCIS-SP) (JN0-364) Practice Tests