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Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 18
Question 170
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Which bounded approval scope avoids unintended changes to other provider or customer services?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
The bounded proposal is: Approve only the bounded change (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.) after independently checking (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The separate acceptance measure remains: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Verify the handoff contract and bridge interface port mode, then restore only the intended tag treatment and VLAN membership.) after independently checking (The customer CE exchanges untagged frames successfully without gaining access to other wholesale service VLANs.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
A separate release decision would approve only the bounded change (Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.) after independently checking (Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. It does not match the current change: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Inspect applicable BGP best-path attributes and local routing policy before modifying any IGP metric or neighboring AS path.) after independently checking (The chosen path matches the documented policy intent and forwarding probes follow the selected healthy upstream.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP and the expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime, respectively.
Question 171
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. Which specific bounded Junos routing or switching correction best addresses this service-provider issue?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: D
Another proposed action is: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint. That does not directly address the observed condition: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. The more targeted correction is: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.
Another proposed action is: Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time. It targets a different dependency; the evidence here is Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Another option proposes: Verify the intended root and edge-port topology, then apply supported root protection on the authorized boundary and restore correct bridge priority. The specific correction is: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result. The deciding evidence is: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
The evidence for the issue is Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. The matching step is: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result. This follows the principle that BGP received routes are subject to policy before their acceptance and installation.
Question 172
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Which observed operational evidence most strongly isolates the actual protocol or forwarding condition?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
Consider this evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. The applicable explanation is: BGP received routes are subject to policy before their acceptance and installation. The matching response is: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.
Another alternative would address Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event as decisive. The actual evidence in this case is Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
This other option describes: Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior. The problem to explain is different: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Another proposed finding is: LAN pseudonode and circuit detail show a DIS chosen using election criteria distinct from the SPF metric assigned to traffic paths. It is not the recorded discriminator, which is Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Question 173
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. Which Junos networking principle best explains the relevant engineering decision?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: C
A different principle is: Junos access and trunk port behavior must align with the expected frame tagging of the attached peer. Evidence for this case: Ethernet frame captures show customer untagged traffic while the bridge interface membership expects an 802.1Q VLAN tag for forwarding. The present evidence, however, is Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. The relevant rule is: BGP received routes are subject to policy before their acceptance and installation.
This alternative invokes: BGP export policy must explicitly control which routing information crosses external administrative boundaries. Evidence for this case: Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The governing distinction for the recorded case is BGP received routes are subject to policy before their acceptance and installation.
The observed evidence is: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. The governing principle is: BGP received routes are subject to policy before their acceptance and installation. Consequently, the targeted action is: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.
That principle concerns another fact pattern: BGP peering requires correctly addressed reachable transport endpoints and compatible session parameters. Evidence for this case: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Here the key fact is: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Question 174
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Intended bounded correction: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result. Which independently verifiable test best demonstrates the intended correction worked?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: C
That result would assess another condition: The chosen path matches the documented policy intent and forwarding probes follow the selected healthy upstream. The correct criterion is directly linked to the finding: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Another proposed result is: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime. It would not independently establish the required outcome: The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.
The expected outcome is the authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary. It links the scoped action to the documented condition: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Passing that test would not establish resolution of the stated issue. The relevant proof is: The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.
Question 175
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. Which material service-availability, routing, switching or security risk most directly needs control?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: C
Another caution is: A permissive EBGP export term can leak sensitive or invalid routes and trigger upstream policy enforcement. The key risk in this case is: Replacing selective import policy with accept-all could expose the ISP to untrusted or excess customer routes.
Another emphasis concerns: Unrestricted changes to every bridge priority can create wide reconvergence and uncontrolled root migration. The current change is Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result; the material limitation is Replacing selective import policy with accept-all could expose the ISP to untrusted or excess customer routes.
The relevant boundary is: Replacing selective import policy with accept-all could expose the ISP to untrusted or excess customer routes. It matters when applying the specific response: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.
Another caution is: Changing reflector scope indiscriminately can create control-plane loops or excess prefix dissemination. The key risk in this case is: Replacing selective import policy with accept-all could expose the ISP to untrusted or excess customer routes.
Question 176
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. Which focused investigation is the most useful before modifying the network configuration?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: D
That check concerns a different signal: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior. The case-relevant check is: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Another check would compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: MAC learning within the broadcast domain is healthy while the IRB logical interface or VLAN-to-IRB binding is missing or mapped to another tenant VLAN. The case observation to isolate is Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. The focused check here is: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Another investigation would compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. It does not directly establish the reported condition: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
The pre-change check should compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. That check directly concerns Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Question 177
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. Which controlled operational implementation sequence best protects the related provider service?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
The case evidence indicates: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. Apply the scoped action: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result. Confirm its effect independently: The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.
An alternative plan is: First verify the observed failure (Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.) before production rollout. It does not test the case-specific condition: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Another possible combination is: First verify the observed failure (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.) before production rollout. The current record instead supports Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result, verified by the authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.
Another potential sequence is: First verify the observed failure (Bridge-domain membership reveals two customer-facing interfaces accidentally attached to one virtual switch despite separate service contracts.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Separate the tenant virtual switches and bridge-domain scopes while preserving the contracted tag translation on each handoff.); then independently verify the intended outcome (Broadcast and unknown-unicast tests remain isolated to each customer and independent service port traffic follows expected boundaries.) before production rollout. It has no direct link to the distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Question 178
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. Which set of evidence, limited change and independent validation best justifies authorization?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
The change-control boundary is: Observed evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), limited correction (Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.), independently measurable result (The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.). The evidence for this scope is Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
An alternative release decision is: Observed evidence (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.), limited correction (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.), independently measurable result (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.). It does not match the current change: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.
Another approval action is: Observed evidence (Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory.), limited correction (Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.), independently measurable result (Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.). The relevant evidence and acceptance are Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route and the authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary, respectively.
Another approval package concerns: Observed evidence (Level-specific database comparisons show an expected peer LSP missing or stale while adjacency counters remain stable and reachable next hops persist.), limited correction (Inspect IS-IS LSP flooding, level scope and database synchronization before deciding on targeted refresh or isolation steps.), independently measurable result (Peer databases converge on the expected LSP set and the authorized loopback routes become usable without forcing widespread protocol resets.). The present scope must instead be justified by Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Question 179
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. If the change fails its expected acceptance test, which controlled recovery approach is most appropriate?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
Another fallback concerns pausing changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Routing table attributes show unequal local preference or other policy-driven BGP path attributes, while transport paths remain healthy.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp best path differs from an operator's simple metric assumption. The current change concerns Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
A recovery option is to pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp route is received but not imported by policy. The intended change was Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result, and acceptance must still be judged against the authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.
Another option proposes: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess ebgp session fails because configured peer address is wrong. Its assumptions differ from the observed failure; the appropriate recovery is: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp route is received but not imported by policy.
Another fallback concerns pausing changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (The IS-IS database contains distinct reachability TLV content while the operational command targets only the inet address family rather than inet6.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess is-is tlv interpretation leads to wrong address family test. The current change concerns Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.
Question 180
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A service provider accepts a BGP peering session but a customer-specific prefix is absent from active route selection after a new import policy is attached. Distinguishing evidence: Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route. Which bounded approval scope avoids unintended changes to other provider or customer services?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: C
A separate release decision would approve only the bounded change (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.) after independently checking (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. It does not match the current change: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.
An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Verify the handoff contract and bridge interface port mode, then restore only the intended tag treatment and VLAN membership.) after independently checking (The customer CE exchanges untagged frames successfully without gaining access to other wholesale service VLANs.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route and the authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary, respectively.
The bounded proposal is: Approve only the bounded change (Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.) after independently checking (The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The separate acceptance measure remains: The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.
A separate release decision would approve only the bounded change (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.) after independently checking (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. It does not match the current change: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.
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