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Juniper JN0-364 Practice Test 17
Question 160
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A shared service-provider Ethernet segment elects an IS-IS DIS different from the router with the lowest configured path metric. Distinguishing evidence: LAN pseudonode and circuit detail show a DIS chosen using election criteria distinct from the SPF metric assigned to traffic paths. Which bounded approval scope avoids unintended changes to other provider or customer services?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.) after independently checking (Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by LAN pseudonode and circuit detail show a DIS chosen using election criteria distinct from the SPF metric assigned to traffic paths.
The bounded proposal is: Approve only the bounded change (Validate LAN circuit priority and DIS role independently from route metrics; change only the control-plane election setting if the design requires it.) after independently checking (The designated intermediate system role matches documented circuit priority policy and shortest-path computations remain consistent.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The separate acceptance measure remains: The designated intermediate system role matches documented circuit priority policy and shortest-path computations remain consistent.
An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Verify domain-level design and configure the approved overlapping IS-IS level on the intended interface and routing instance.) after independently checking (The pair establishes an adjacency at the planned level and corresponding level-specific link-state information is exchanged.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are LAN pseudonode and circuit detail show a DIS chosen using election criteria distinct from the SPF metric assigned to traffic paths and the designated intermediate system role matches documented circuit priority policy and shortest-path computations remain consistent, respectively.
Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Compare level-specific route metrics and approved traffic-engineering intent, then restore or adjust the scoped metric with a measured failover plan.) after independently checking (Representative destinations use the intended ring path and link utilization remains within the approved operational envelope.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by LAN pseudonode and circuit detail show a DIS chosen using election criteria distinct from the SPF metric assigned to traffic paths.
Question 161
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Which specific bounded Junos routing or switching correction best addresses this service-provider issue?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
EBGP session fails because configured peer address is wrong. The decisive observation is the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The proposed fix is: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint. An observable result is: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
Another proposed action is: Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only. It targets a different dependency; the evidence here is the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
Another option proposes: Inspect IS-IS LSP flooding, level scope and database synchronization before deciding on targeted refresh or isolation steps. The specific correction is: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint. The deciding evidence is: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
That alternative concerns: Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result. The relevant evidence is the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The corresponding fix is: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
Question 162
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Which observed operational evidence most strongly isolates the actual protocol or forwarding condition?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
This other option describes: MSTP instance membership and region parameters show the second VLAN mapped into the first spanning-tree instance and mismatched neighboring regional configuration. The problem to explain is different: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
The record points to the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. After confirming the clue, the appropriate response is: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
Another piece of evidence concerns Advertised route inspection lists a private customer prefix that is not present in the approved external export inventory. The current incident instead shows: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. This distinction supports the action: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
Another alternative would address Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event as decisive. The actual evidence in this case is the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
Question 163
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Which Junos networking principle best explains the relevant engineering decision?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
The competing option invokes: IBGP route reflection relies on explicit client relationships and correct propagation semantics. Evidence for this case: Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior. The present evidence is: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The case-relevant principle is: BGP peering requires correctly addressed reachable transport endpoints and compatible session parameters.
BGP peering requires correctly addressed reachable transport endpoints and compatible session parameters. This distinction accounts for the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP; another unrelated mechanism would not address the same condition.
A different principle is: IS-IS path computation follows topology information and relevant link metrics. Evidence for this case: IS-IS topology output reflects the new interface cost and SPF paths differ, while link utilization counters align with the changed shortest path. The present evidence, however, is the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The relevant rule is: BGP peering requires correctly addressed reachable transport endpoints and compatible session parameters.
This alternative invokes: BGP hold timers and KEEPALIVE messages provide session liveness independent of accepted route policies. Evidence for this case: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The governing distinction for the recorded case is BGP peering requires correctly addressed reachable transport endpoints and compatible session parameters.
Question 164
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Intended bounded correction: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint. Which independently verifiable test best demonstrates the intended correction worked?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
A different option checks: The chosen path matches the documented policy intent and forwarding probes follow the selected healthy upstream. The case-specific acceptance condition is instead the expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
The independent verification condition is: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime. That result checks whether the original evidence—the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP—has been addressed.
That result would assess another condition: The approved access segment forwards safely while a repeat unauthorized BPDU test triggers the intended control with an audit trail. The correct criterion is directly linked to the finding: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
Another proposed result is: The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary. It would not independently establish the required outcome: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
Question 165
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Which material service-availability, routing, switching or security risk most directly needs control?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: D
Another emphasis concerns: Replacing selective import policy with accept-all could expose the ISP to untrusted or excess customer routes. The current change is Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint; the material limitation is Changing ASN or routing policy without verifying the transport endpoint can create a separate outage or route leak.
This limitation concerns another setting: Editing MSTP instance mappings without confirming region consistency can cause boundary behavior and a wider service outage. The observed facts here make a different caution decisive: Changing ASN or routing policy without verifying the transport endpoint can create a separate outage or route leak.
Another caution is: A permissive EBGP export term can leak sensitive or invalid routes and trigger upstream policy enforcement. The key risk in this case is: Changing ASN or routing policy without verifying the transport endpoint can create a separate outage or route leak.
A necessary safeguard is: Changing ASN or routing policy without verifying the transport endpoint can create a separate outage or route leak. The proposed correction remains: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
Question 166
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Which focused investigation is the most useful before modifying the network configuration?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: D
Another check would compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event. The case observation to isolate is the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The focused check here is: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
Another investigation would compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: Routing table attributes show unequal local preference or other policy-driven BGP path attributes, while transport paths remain healthy. It does not directly establish the reported condition: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
That check concerns a different signal: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: MAC forwarding tables on the access switch show the customer source learned on an unexpected access port and no destination learning for the intended bridge domain. The case-relevant check is: Compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
The focused investigation should compare active Junos routing, protocol and forwarding displays with this differentiating observed evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. It is tied to the observed evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. It tests the conditions for this response: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
Question 167
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Which controlled operational implementation sequence best protects the related provider service?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: B
Another possible combination is: First verify the observed failure (RSTP operational detail shows the new attachment advertising superior BPDUs and becoming root instead of the designated provider bridge.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Verify the intended root and edge-port topology, then apply supported root protection on the authorized boundary and restore correct bridge priority.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The provider bridge remains legitimate root and a controlled superior-BPDU test is contained without permanent loop formation.) before production rollout. The current record instead supports Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint, verified by the expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
The starting point is the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The proposed action and its separate check are Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint and the expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime, respectively.
Another action-and-check pairing is: First verify the observed failure (Reflector peer listings show one intended client configured as an ordinary peer and the route advertisements lack the expected client reflection behavior.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Confirm route-reflector client groups, cluster design and route-policy boundaries, then correct the selected client relationship only.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The relevant routes propagate to authorized internal BGP clients without duplicating unintended advertisements or exporting customer-private routes.) before production rollout. The evidence here is the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The required action and proof are Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint and the expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
An alternative plan is: First verify the observed failure (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.); review and authorize the bounded correction (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.); then independently verify the intended outcome (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.) before production rollout. It does not test the case-specific condition: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
Question 168
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Which set of evidence, limited change and independent validation best justifies authorization?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: D
An alternative release decision is: Observed evidence (Layer 2 logs show RSTP topology change and port role transition while BGP sessions remain established and their route tables are stable.), limited correction (Inspect spanning-tree interface states, alternate paths and convergence behavior and tune only supported Layer 2 features within the validated topology.), independently measurable result (A link failover test shows stable alternate Layer 2 forwarding without persistent loops and unchanged unrelated BGP routing.). It does not match the current change: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
Another approval action is: Observed evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), limited correction (Investigate transport reliability, control-plane load and negotiated timer behavior before adjusting route filters or hold time.), independently measurable result (The session remains established over representative monitored intervals and loss testing confirms appropriate recovery behavior.). The relevant evidence and acceptance are the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP and the expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime, respectively.
Another approval package concerns: Observed evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), limited correction (Review the prefix-length and routing-policy terms, allow only the contracted prefix range and verify the actual import result.), independently measurable result (The authorized customer route becomes usable and adjacent unapproved prefixes remain rejected at the policy boundary.). The present scope must instead be justified by the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
The approval decision should consider the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The specific proposal is: Observed evidence (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.), limited correction (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.), independently measurable result (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.). Its measurable outcome is: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
Question 169
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. If the change fails its expected acceptance test, which controlled recovery approach is most appropriate?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: D
Another recovery route would pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Peer history contains hold timer expirations and packet captures show sporadic missing keepalives during a saturated control-plane event.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp keepalive hold-time expectations do not match session state. It does not preserve the condition of this case: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. The bounded fallback is: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess ebgp session fails because configured peer address is wrong.
Another option proposes: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Received-route visibility shows the customer prefix, while the import policy match excludes its approved prefix length and the RIB lacks the route.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess bgp route is received but not imported by policy. Its assumptions differ from the observed failure; the appropriate recovery is: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess ebgp session fails because configured peer address is wrong.
Another fallback concerns pausing changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (Packet capture on the provider-facing trunk shows the wrong outer service tag with otherwise correct customer inner VLAN identifiers.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess q-in-q outer tag does not match provider bridge service. The current change concerns the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
If the change fails acceptance, the bounded recovery is: Pause changes, preserve the differentiating evidence (The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.), restore the last approved safe network state and reassess ebgp session fails because configured peer address is wrong. The case-specific risk is Changing ASN or routing policy without verifying the transport endpoint can create a separate outage or route leak. The original evidence remains: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
Question 170
A fictional Junos service-provider engineer encounters this scenario: A provider edge has IP reachability to an upstream handoff yet the new external BGP session stays idle after a configuration migration. Distinguishing evidence: The neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP. Which bounded approval scope avoids unintended changes to other provider or customer services?
Answer and Explanation
Correct Answer: A
The bounded proposal is: Approve only the bounded change (Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.) after independently checking (The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The separate acceptance measure remains: The expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime.
Another proposed approval would approve only the bounded change (Verify the handoff contract and bridge interface port mode, then restore only the intended tag treatment and VLAN membership.) after independently checking (The customer CE exchanges untagged frames successfully without gaining access to other wholesale service VLANs.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The present scope must instead be justified by the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP.
A separate release decision would approve only the bounded change (Apply a precise export filter and route-policy tests for public prefixes, then confirm rejected customer-only routes stay internal.) after independently checking (Upstream advertised-route output contains only approved prefixes and the private customer destination remains available in its intended instance.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. It does not match the current change: Verify peering transport addresses, configured peer ASN, reachability and authentication, then correct only the approved BGP neighbor endpoint.
An alternative approval would approve only the bounded change (Inspect applicable BGP best-path attributes and local routing policy before modifying any IGP metric or neighboring AS path.) after independently checking (The chosen path matches the documented policy intent and forwarding probes follow the selected healthy upstream.), without quietly widening the provider or customer network scope. The relevant evidence and acceptance are the neighboring router advertises a different source address from the one in the local configured BGP neighbor statement and logs show connection attempts to the obsolete IP and the expected external session reaches Established and exchanges only agreed IPv4 routes with stable uptime, respectively.
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