Google Professional Cloud Network Engineer Practice Test 20 - Prepaway
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Google Professional Cloud Network Engineer Practice Test 20

Question 190

In fictional Maplebridge Systems, operators encountered: Several platform teams independently deploy conflicting ingress controllers and Gateway resources for one externally shared application entry point. Evidence: Controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence. They propose: Select a supported GKE Gateway or Ingress design with clear controller ownership and attach only approved route resources. Which independent result best confirms the change works?

  1. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: A permitted administrator manages the cluster from the approved access route while an unauthorized internet host cannot connect.
  2. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: The cluster scales through a controlled node-pool increase while Pod addresses are allocated from intended authorized ranges.
  3. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener.
  4. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: A representative dual-stack application communicates over intended address families under approved firewall policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener. Without that result, the finding controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence would remain unresolved.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A test that a permitted administrator manages the cluster from the approved access route while an unauthorized internet host cannot connect would not demonstrate closure of this condition. The needed proof is Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener.

B:

The cluster scales through a controlled node-pool increase while Pod addresses are allocated from intended authorized ranges. That does not demonstrate the case-specific success condition: Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener. Kubernetes north-south traffic policies should align with the selected managed controller and its ownership boundaries.

D:

A representative dual-stack application communicates over intended address families under approved firewall policy. That result does not test the original problem, identified by controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence. Recovery must show that Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener.

Question 191

At fictional Maplebridge Systems, the global connectivity strategy group reviews: Several platform teams independently deploy conflicting ingress controllers and Gateway resources for one externally shared application entry point. Evidence: Controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence. Which Google Cloud networking design principle best explains the required correction?

  1. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: IP-family support must be coordinated across VPC subnets, GKE workloads, and external access services.
  2. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: VPC-native GKE uses alias IP and secondary address planning that is separate from ordinary node primary IP planning.
  3. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: Kubernetes north-south traffic policies should align with the selected managed controller and its ownership boundaries.
  4. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: Private control-plane accessibility depends on actual authorized network routing and API access policy, not on the cluster's existence.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Kubernetes north-south traffic policies should align with the selected managed controller and its ownership boundaries. The diagnostic record, controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence, fits that mechanism rather than a separate system issue.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A proposed explanation is IP-family support must be coordinated across VPC subnets, GKE workloads, and external access services. The present evidence is controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence, which instead follows from Kubernetes north-south traffic policies should align with the selected managed controller and its ownership boundaries.

B:

VPC-native GKE uses alias IP and secondary address planning that is separate from ordinary node primary IP planning. This describes another relationship, not the cause of several platform teams independently deploy conflicting ingress controllers and Gateway resources for one externally shared application entry point. Kubernetes north-south traffic policies should align with the selected managed controller and its ownership boundaries.

D:

The rule private control-plane accessibility depends on actual authorized network routing and API access policy, not on the cluster's existence does not account for controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence. This case is governed by Kubernetes north-south traffic policies should align with the selected managed controller and its ownership boundaries.

Question 192

At fictional Maplebridge Systems, the observed incident is: Several platform teams independently deploy conflicting ingress controllers and Gateway resources for one externally shared application entry point. The diagnostic finding is: Controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence. Which action AND separate measurable verification best address this case?

  1. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: Action: Provide supported private cluster control-plane reachability through an authorized management network and necessary endpoint access controls. Independent proof: A permitted administrator manages the cluster from the approved access route while an unauthorized internet host cannot connect.
  2. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: Action: Plan supported additional secondary Pod ranges and Pod density allocations based on realistic future node counts and deployment regions. Independent proof: The cluster scales through a controlled node-pool increase while Pod addresses are allocated from intended authorized ranges.
  3. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: Action: Validate supported GKE dual-stack configuration and design VPC, cluster, Pod, and service address ranges before deployment. Independent proof: A representative dual-stack application communicates over intended address families under approved firewall policy.
  4. For fictional Maplebridge Systems, global connectivity strategy group: Action: Select a supported GKE Gateway or Ingress design with clear controller ownership and attach only approved route resources. Independent proof: Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Kubernetes north-south traffic policies should align with the selected managed controller and its ownership boundaries. The action is to select a supported GKE Gateway or Ingress design with clear controller ownership and attach only approved route resources; the independent test is that Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Action: Provide supported private cluster control-plane reachability through an authorized management network and necessary endpoint access controls. Independent proof: A permitted administrator manages the cluster from the approved access route while an unauthorized internet host cannot connect. It misses the relevant dependency because Kubernetes north-south traffic policies should align with the selected managed controller and its ownership boundaries. Instead verify that Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener.

B:

The proposed pair addresses Action: Plan supported additional secondary Pod ranges and Pod density allocations based on realistic future node counts and deployment regions. Independent proof: The cluster scales through a controlled node-pool increase while Pod addresses are allocated from intended authorized ranges. Here controller status and routing inventory show overlapping ownership of listener and route configuration with unexpected rule precedence. The bounded response is select a supported GKE Gateway or Ingress design with clear controller ownership and attach only approved route resources with proof that Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener.

C:

The alternative action and test—Action: Validate supported GKE dual-stack configuration and design VPC, cluster, Pod, and service address ranges before deployment. Independent proof: A representative dual-stack application communicates over intended address families under approved firewall policy—would measure a different issue. This case requires select a supported GKE Gateway or Ingress design with clear controller ownership and attach only approved route resources and confirmation that Host- and path-based requests reach the correct healthy backends and an unowned route cannot change another team's listener.

Question 193

At fictional Windward Software, the VPC implementation engineers operate shared networking, policy routing and Kubernetes clusters. A Google Cloud network issue is reported: A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. The decisive observation is: IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Which scoped engineering response is most appropriate?

  1. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Choose an approved non-overlapping expansion within Google Cloud subnet range rules and update centralized IP allocation records.
  2. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.
  3. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Enable and validate appropriate Private Google Access behavior for the workload subnet, routing, and allowed service endpoints.
  4. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Review perimeter membership, allowed ingress and egress policies, and restricted API endpoints without weakening the overall data boundary.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries. The case-specific correction is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. Confirm that the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Another possible response is to choose an approved non-overlapping expansion within Google Cloud subnet range rules and update centralized IP allocation records. The case evidence instead shows that IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

C:

Enable and validate appropriate Private Google Access behavior for the workload subnet, routing, and allowed service endpoints. This does not address the reported incident: a workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The case-specific correction is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.

D:

One alternative would be to review perimeter membership, allowed ingress and egress policies, and restricted API endpoints without weakening the overall data boundary. The observed evidence instead shows that IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The more relevant correction is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.

Question 194

The VPC implementation engineers at fictional Windward Software investigates: A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. Which particular observation would most directly distinguish the network cause before changing production resources?

  1. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: The VPC IP allocation plan flags an intersecting address block and the subnet modification is rejected or would create ambiguity.
  2. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Audit logs identify a service perimeter violation rather than a packet firewall deny or bad DNS lookup.
  3. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project.
  4. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Subnet configuration shows Private Google Access disabled and no alternative supported private API reachability path exists.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. That observation distinguishes the reported incident because shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries. The appropriate response is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The VPC IP allocation plan flags an intersecting address block and the subnet modification is rejected or would create ambiguity. It does not account for the observation IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project in the reported situation.

B:

One proposed finding is audit logs identify a service perimeter violation rather than a packet firewall deny or bad DNS lookup. This would indicate another failure; here IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

D:

The alternative observation, subnet configuration shows Private Google Access disabled and no alternative supported private API reachability path exists, concerns a different dependency. This incident is distinguished by IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

Question 195

In fictional Windward Software, operators encountered: A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. Evidence: IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. They propose: Grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. Which independent result best confirms the change works?

  1. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: The private VM makes permitted API calls without acquiring an external IP address or traversing an unapproved proxy.
  2. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: The designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.
  3. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: An intended call is admitted from the approved source while a deliberately external exfiltration attempt remains denied.
  4. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Additional VMs receive intended IPs and no existing Pod, service, or peered network prefix becomes ambiguous.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Verify the change by checking that the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach. The original clue was IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The test is meaningful because shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Even verifying the private VM makes permitted API calls without acquiring an external IP address or traversing an unapproved proxy leaves the reported failure unproven. An acceptance test must show that the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

C:

The alternative outcome is an intended call is admitted from the approved source while a deliberately external exfiltration attempt remains denied. It may validate a separate setting, but not the required action: grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. The required observation is the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

D:

Additional VMs receive intended IPs and no existing Pod, service, or peered network prefix becomes ambiguous. The evidence relevant to this incident is IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Confirm the corresponding recovery result: The designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

Question 196

At fictional Windward Software, the VPC implementation engineers reviews: A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. Evidence: IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Which Google Cloud networking design principle best explains the required correction?

  1. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: VPC Service Controls enforce service-level data boundaries in addition to ordinary VPC network access.
  2. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.
  3. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Network range expansion must preserve unique primary and secondary address assignments across connected resources.
  4. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: API access from private VMs requires deliberate Google services reachability distinct from arbitrary internet access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The underlying rule is that shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries. IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. A suitable correction is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

VPC Service Controls enforce service-level data boundaries in addition to ordinary VPC network access. The decisive observation, IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project, requires a different explanation: Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

C:

A different principle is: network range expansion must preserve unique primary and secondary address assignments across connected resources. The causal link actually supported by IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project is shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

D:

API access from private VMs requires deliberate Google services reachability distinct from arbitrary internet access. However, it does not explain IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The applicable principle is that shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

Question 197

At fictional Windward Software, the observed incident is: A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. The diagnostic finding is: IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Which action AND separate measurable verification best address this case?

  1. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Action: Enable and validate appropriate Private Google Access behavior for the workload subnet, routing, and allowed service endpoints. Independent proof: The private VM makes permitted API calls without acquiring an external IP address or traversing an unapproved proxy.
  2. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Action: Review perimeter membership, allowed ingress and egress policies, and restricted API endpoints without weakening the overall data boundary. Independent proof: An intended call is admitted from the approved source while a deliberately external exfiltration attempt remains denied.
  3. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Action: Grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. Independent proof: The designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.
  4. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Action: Choose an approved non-overlapping expansion within Google Cloud subnet range rules and update centralized IP allocation records. Independent proof: Additional VMs receive intended IPs and no existing Pod, service, or peered network prefix becomes ambiguous.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The underlying clue is IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Correct it by grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy and confirm that the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Action: Enable and validate appropriate Private Google Access behavior for the workload subnet, routing, and allowed service endpoints. Independent proof: The private VM makes permitted API calls without acquiring an external IP address or traversing an unapproved proxy. The pair does not resolve the observed IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Use grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy and verify the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

B:

The alternate plan combines Action: Review perimeter membership, allowed ingress and egress policies, and restricted API endpoints without weakening the overall data boundary. Independent proof: An intended call is admitted from the approved source while a deliberately external exfiltration attempt remains denied. The identified fault is IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Closing it requires the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

D:

The alternative proposal is Action: Choose an approved non-overlapping expansion within Google Cloud subnet range rules and update centralized IP allocation records. Independent proof: Additional VMs receive intended IPs and no existing Pod, service, or peered network prefix becomes ambiguous. It does not address the current evidence: IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The appropriate action is grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.

Question 198

At fictional Windward Software, engineers propose: Grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. for an issue where A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. Which limitation should they explicitly evaluate before release?

  1. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Allowing all perimeter egress to silence violations would undermine the intended data exfiltration protection.
  2. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Expansion may be constrained by adjacent allocations and cannot be solved by forcefully overlapping live routes.
  3. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Private Google Access does not automatically grant API authorization or bypass IAM and organization-level restrictions.
  4. For fictional Windward Software, VPC implementation engineers: Granting host-wide network administrator privileges to fix one subnet attachment would unnecessarily expand access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. The clue IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project supports the bounded action: Grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. Confirm that the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Allowing all perimeter egress to silence violations would undermine the intended data exfiltration protection. It could be useful for another problem, but it does not change IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The response needs to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.

B:

An alternative action is expansion may be constrained by adjacent allocations and cannot be solved by forcefully overlapping live routes. This incident instead involves IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Confirm the scoped change through the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach.

C:

Private Google Access does not automatically grant API authorization or bypass IAM and organization-level restrictions. That would not correct the reported IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The supported response is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.

Question 199

At fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, the infrastructure provisioning team automates service-project and network connectivity controls. A Google Cloud network issue is reported: A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. The decisive observation is: IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Which scoped engineering response is most appropriate?

  1. For fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, infrastructure provisioning team: Grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy.
  2. For fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, infrastructure provisioning team: Choose an approved non-overlapping expansion within Google Cloud subnet range rules and update centralized IP allocation records.
  3. For fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, infrastructure provisioning team: Enable and validate appropriate Private Google Access behavior for the workload subnet, routing, and allowed service endpoints.
  4. For fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, infrastructure provisioning team: Review perimeter membership, allowed ingress and egress policies, and restricted API endpoints without weakening the overall data boundary.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries. The case-specific correction is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. Confirm that the designated service project deploys its instance into the allowed shared subnet while another unapproved project remains unable to attach. In Summit Ridge Clinics, a workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Another possible response is to choose an approved non-overlapping expansion within Google Cloud subnet range rules and update centralized IP allocation records. The case evidence instead shows that IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries. In Summit Ridge Clinics, a workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet.

C:

Enable and validate appropriate Private Google Access behavior for the workload subnet, routing, and allowed service endpoints. This does not address the reported incident: a workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The case-specific correction is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. In Summit Ridge Clinics, a workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet.

D:

One alternative would be to review perimeter membership, allowed ingress and egress policies, and restricted API endpoints without weakening the overall data boundary. The observed evidence instead shows that IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. The more relevant correction is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. In Summit Ridge Clinics, a workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet.

Question 200

The infrastructure provisioning team at fictional Summit Ridge Clinics investigates: A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet. Which particular observation would most directly distinguish the network cause before changing production resources?

  1. For fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, infrastructure provisioning team: The VPC IP allocation plan flags an intersecting address block and the subnet modification is rejected or would create ambiguity.
  2. For fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, infrastructure provisioning team: Subnet configuration shows Private Google Access disabled and no alternative supported private API reachability path exists.
  3. For fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, infrastructure provisioning team: IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project.
  4. For fictional Summit Ridge Clinics, infrastructure provisioning team: Audit logs identify a service perimeter violation rather than a packet firewall deny or bad DNS lookup.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. That observation distinguishes the reported incident because shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries. The appropriate response is to grant the narrowly needed shared-subnet use permission on the intended host network resource under approved organization policy. The reported issue is A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The VPC IP allocation plan flags an intersecting address block and the subnet modification is rejected or would create ambiguity. It does not account for the observation IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project in the reported situation. The reported issue is A workload deployment succeeds in the application project yet its VM network interface creation is denied for the intended centrally owned subnet.

B:

One proposed finding is subnet configuration shows Private Google Access disabled and no alternative supported private API reachability path exists. This would indicate another failure; here IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

D:

The alternative observation, audit logs identify a service perimeter violation rather than a packet firewall deny or bad DNS lookup, concerns a different dependency. This incident is distinguished by IAM audit shows the deployment identity has compute permissions in its service project but no authorized subnet-user access in the host project. Shared VPC resource deployment crosses host/network and service/application IAM boundaries.

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